Chapter 3: Background
What is surveillance?
In order to give this discussion some grounding, it is necessary to introduce it with some definition and broad discussion of the main terms. To begin with surveillance, which is generally defined in Chamber’s 21st Century Dictionary as “a close watch over something or someone”, deriving from the French word ‘surveiller’, which means literally ‘to see or view or watch over’. In the context of the workplace, surveillance has been defined as “the structured observation of an individual’s movements and transactions” (Davies, 1999).
Surveillance may occur in either covert or overt form. In covert surveillance, the surveillance equipment is invisible and the ‘subject’ is unaware that they are being surveilled, whilst overt surveillance refers to that which is carried out with the subject’s knowledge. There has recently been increasing concern expressed about the growth in both of these forms of surveillance, particularly in relation to new forms of surveillance technology which have become widely available. Although there are few statistics about the extent of surveillance, one indicator is that over 250,000 covert cameras were sold in Britain in 1998.
The accompanying increase in workplace surveillance has also been noted by many as a disturbing trend. An unpublished 1998 survey of heads of security in 103 firms ranging from large multinationals to small enterprises revealed a high disposition among managers to use surveillance as a means of monitoring their workforce:
63% had experienced bugging in one or more of the organisations they had worked for or with;
73% said they could foresee a situation which would warrant their using a bugging device;
93% said they thought other people’s use of bugging devices for solving crime within an organisation was legitimate.
(Source: Snoopers At Work publication)
The concept of ‘panopticism’ is closely linked to the theme of surveillance. It derives from a 19th century architectural design, whereby inhabitants were aware they could potentially be observed at any time. Proposed originally by Jeremy Bentham in early 19th century England, the panopticon was a prison design that represented an architectural system of social discipline which could be applied not only to prisons but also asylums, hospitals, schools and factories. Individuals would be kept isolated in rings of individual cells, all of which would be observable from a central observation tower (see diagram below). By means of features such as backlighting and blinds, these individuals could not see their observers and thus had to assume they were under constant observation. Under such circumstances, they would have to discipline themselves to follow the institution’s rules at all times.
Please refer to image by Willey Reveley, appended as footer, or visit: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panopticon#/media/File:Panopticon.jpg .
Foucault drew attention to the merit of the panopticon as a metaphor for the modern disciplinary power apparatus, based on isolation, individuation and supervision. He also highlighted the all-important phenomenon of ‘self-policing’, whereby the individual’s awareness of constantly being watched has the effect of making them behave as they should, in order to avoid punishment (Foucault, 1977a). The implications of Foucault’s work are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
Many academic commentators have drawn comparisons between panopticism and new forms of surveillance technologies, arguing that technology has enabled the creation of an alternative form of panopticon (see for example Burrell, 1997; Whitaker, 1999). The next chapter goes on to discuss the current and emerging surveillance technologies and examines whether they really do constitute a ‘virtual panopticon’..
Chapter 4: The Virtual Panopticon
How is technology being used to create a Panopticon?
Surveillance technologies have been defined as:
“technologies which can monitor, track and assess the movements, activities and communications of individuals. These include an array of visual recording devices, bugging equipment, computer information systems and identification systems…”
Source: Privacy International Report: Big Brother Incorporated, 1996).
The growth in surveillance technologies is not limited to their use, but applies equally to the industry’s capacity to produce ever more effective devices. As a result, recent advances in surveillance technologies represent a huge increase in the potential to observe efficiently (although not necessarily accurately,) and discretely, within both work contexts and wider society. Such technologies encompass a broad range of devices, including closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras, audio bugs and swipe cards.
These devices are categorised here as either informational-, communications-, environmental-, physical and performance surveillance. Within this classification, informational surveillance refers to the collection and monitoring of personal data, such as medical, financial and employment records. Communication surveillance is the monitoring of communication in all its various forms, including via telephone, facsimile and computer. Environmental surveillance is defined as monitoring within a particular environmental context, e.g. the workplace or the city centre, whilst physical surveillance relates specifically to the work domain and the wide range of technologies available to monitor employees’ performance at work. The technologies within each of these categories will be discussed in turn, beginning with informational surveillance.
4.1 Informational Surveillance
The gathering of personal data is often overlooked as a form of surveillance; instead being accepted as a necessary evil of bureaucratic institutions. However, the increase in the use of databases to store personal information has led to increasing attention being paid to the volume of information that is held about any particular individual, and about how exactly that information is used. Databases as a form of technology enable organisations to collect vast amounts of data and, used in conjunction with integrative computer networks, they allow organisations to build a comprehensive portrait of a single individual. Concern about this ability has led to the development of Data Protection laws across the EU, which generally stipulate that individuals must be allowed to access any information relating to them, and know for what purpose it is held.
However, there remain emerging forms of technology that are not necessarily governed by these legal developments, and of which the general public are still relatively ignorant. Perhaps the most obvious area in which this is the case is market research. Gathering information at the level of the individual consumer has become vital to the monitoring of consumer behaviour, leading to the phenomenon of the ‘panopticon sort’ (Gandy 1996), whereby increasing amounts of electronically held information is processed for the purposes of niche marketing. This is increasingly the case with the advent of ‘customer relationship management’, a recent marketing trend, which attempts to leverage customer value by differentiating service delivery to the level of the individual customer – the so-called ‘market of one’. This is achieved through focus on specific measures of customer ‘value’, such as share of customer spend, mass personalisation, customer lifetime value and value chain mapping, definition and management. New technologies enable this approach by allowing information to be collected during every interaction with the individual customer. Such technologies include the store loyalty cards that have become so widespread in recent years. These cards are not simply a mechanism to induce loyalty through the gathering of ‘points’; they also allow comprehensive information to be gathered about the individual consumer’s purchasing habits, with the customer providing the information voluntarily and free of charge. The same applies to consumer preference tracking software, which operates in the majority electronic commerce environments. This sophisticated software tracks purchase habits within a particular web site, and then uses that information to tailor purchase recommendations and advertising material. A good example of this is amazon.com, the online book and music store, which makes tailored recommendations on the basis of previous customers’ purchase behaviour (i.e. “customers who bought this book also bought…”). Amazon is seen to be a market leader in relation to its use of these technologies and many other companies are striving to imitate its methods. Indeed, this recommendation capability can be considered advantageous to consumers, but many do not necessarily realise the extent to which technology-enabled surveillance is going on ‘behind the scenes’.
4.2 Communicational Surveillance
Similarly, communicational surveillance tends to be carried out without the subject’s knowledge. Communicational surveillance has extended to all forms of business communications technology, including the telephone, facsimile and electronic mail (e-mail). The incidence of communications monitoring is extremely high within certain industries, as highlighted in a recent survey by the New York-based American Management Association, which found that nearly three quarters of major U.S. firms (73.5%) record and review employee communications and activities on the job, including their phone calls, e-mail, Internet connections, and computer files (AMA Survey, 2000). The figure has doubled since 1997, and has increased significantly over the past year. Additional forms of monitoring and surveillance, such as reviewing phone logs or videotaping for security purposes, bring the overall figure to 78%, up from the previous year’s 67%. Moreover, a previous survey found that for every company that monitors telephone conversations on an as-needed basis after actions have already placed an employee under suspicion, three companies monitor conversations on a random, routine or ongoing basis (AMA Survey, 1999).
The sophistication of some telephone surveillance can be surprising, as in the case of the ‘Truth Phone’, which analyses stress levels in the speaker’s voice in order to detect possible deception. Others are, however, far less fantastical. Telephone Information Management Systems (TIMS), for example, simply capture all transactional activity on a phone, together with destination numbers and times, providing data which can then be processes and analysed by other forms of technology.
Corporate voicemail systems are also subject to systematic or random monitoring by managers. Most new systems have default pass codes for administrators, which have access to all message boxes.
Electronic mail is a particularly appropriate medium for communications monitoring, especially bearing in mind the masses of software products that have become available for exactly this purpose. Such technologies entail several possible approaches toward e-mail monitoring: there is software available to flag when an e-mail message contains pre-defined keywords, so for example an employer may choose to review any e-mail message that contains the words ‘curriculum+vitae’ as this may be an indication that an employee is using the corporate communications system to find another job. There is also software available to search message content by context rather than by keyword, analysing a company’s entire e-mail traffic phrase by phrase, and drawing conclusions about whether each message is legitimate company business (Davies, 1999).
Alternatively, employers may monitor e-mail by simply randomly reviewing e-mail transmissions of specific employees. This was the case with a friend of mine who was working on a temporary basis in the administration department of a large utilities company. Having been called to her supervisor’s office, this friend was confronted with a large pile of printed e-mail messages, told the content was considered illegitimate and wholly unsuitable for the company system, and was advised that she had lost her job as a result. This incident came as a complete shock to her, as it does to many employees who were previously unaware that their communication is monitored. Moreover, even where employees are made aware that surveillance takes places, i.e. in cases where it is justified on the grounds of preventing industrial espionage, employees often do not expect ‘private’ communication – that to friends and family – to be under equal scrutiny.
This notion of ‘privacy’ will be discussed further in later chapters.
4.3 Environmental Surveillance
Historically, environmental surveillance has tended to be associated more closely with surveillance in public spaces, rather than the workplace. Perhaps the most common form is the closed-circuit television (CCTV) camera, the presence of which has become a common feature of many, if not most, public places. As academic commentators have noted “in Britain…in almost every area to which the public have access we are under surveillance from CCTV” (Norris & Armstrong, 1999). A crime prevention rationale has underpinned the emergence of CCTV as “the fifth utility” (Graham, 1998), as it is integrated into the urban environment in much the same way as the electricity supply and the telephone network were in the first half of the 20th century.
The fifth utility vision provides some insight into the development of a ‘virtual panopticon’. Graham predicts that visual surveillance technologies will merge with telecommunications networks – particularly the internet. Digital compression techniques and the development of the Internet and broadband cable networks will then provide the infrastructure for people and organisations to simply plug in and rent their camera networks, uch as we use phones or leased lines today. Advances in micro-cameras, automated tracking, image database and facial recognition techniques will all serve to enhance the cost-effectiveness of CCTV (Davies, 1999).
Moreover, the increasing possibilities for integrating various CCTV systems into a comprehensive surveillance network “quantitatively increases the size and scope of systems and qualitatively impacts on the ability to target and track individuals as they move through a much larger area” (Norris & Armstrong, 1999).
This total visual surveillance may well be complemented by an audio soundtrack. Technologies that can covertly detect conversations are increasingly available and it is not illegal to sell or possess bugs in Britain, although it is technically illegal to use them for transmissions without a license from the Department of Trade and Industry. A report published in 1996 estimated that around 200,000 bugs are sold annually in Britain (Privacy International Report, 1999). The majority of these are simple transmitting microphones, but an increasing number are capable of tapping computers and telephones, as well as recording and broadcasting visual images. The devices range from micro-engineered transmitters, the size of an office staple, to bugs the size of a packet of cigarettes, which are capable of transmitting video and sound signals for miles (Davies, 1999).
4.4 Physical Surveillance
Physical surveillance is another area of recent development, particularly in relation to drug testing. Screening employees for alcohol and/or illegal drugs has typically been an initiative of U.S. companies, but rapid take-up within the U.K. could entail such activity becoming commonplace within British organisations. This is perhaps hardly surprising when alcohol alone has been estimated to cost U.K. industry £2.7 billion annually through impaired work performance (Financial Mail on Sunday, 19/12/1999, pp.32).
Drug testing methods have evolved rapidly in light of this increasing usage, and now range from urine sampling to random testing of hair, which supposedly constitutes far more effective sample material.
Drug testing kits are freely available on the market, and via the Internet. Davies (1999) quotes the example of DRUGCHECK 5TM, a urinalysis drug testing kit that detects the five most commonly tested drugs within SAMHSA cut-off levels. The test – involving a coated paper strip – can be conducted without the need for a laboratory and the results are available within five minutes.
Despite advances in methods of obtaining and analysing a drug test sample, the tests are far from infallible. It has been reported that up to 40 percent of tests are inaccurate (Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioners Office Report, 1993). Tests have even been proven incapable of making a distinction between illegal and legal substances:
“Depronil, a prescription drug used to treat Parkinson’s Disease, has shown up as an amphetamine on standard drug tests. Over-the-counter anti-inflammatory drugs like Ibuprofen have shown up positive on the marijuana test. Even the poppy seeds found in baked goods can produce a positive result for heroin.” (Davies, 1999)
An alternative form of physical surveillance – biometrics – is a far less fallible surveillance mechanism. It is arguably within the field of biometrics that science and technology have had the most impact upon surveillance capabilities, and that physical surveillance is being carried out to its fullest extent. Biometrics has been defined as “the process of collecting, processing and storing details of a person’s unique physical characteristics” (Davies, 1999). In theory, biometrics has the ability to identify a person precisely, eliminating the need for less accurate forms of identity. Because of this, biometrics has been employed by national governments and high-security operations for some time, and is now entering the work domain.
The most common manifestations of biometrics in the workplace are fingerprinting, hand geometry, thumb scans, retinal scans, and voice- and face recognition.
4.5 Performance Surveillance
Finally, performance surveillance may incorporate several of the other aforementioned forms of surveillance in order to monitor employees’ work performance. This is evident in the case of one U.S. company wherein an electronic sensor recorded whether or not employees were in the lavatory, another workstation, the smoking lounge or the payphone area (I.L.O. report, quoted in Labour Research, 1998). Performance surveillance refers specifically, however, to surveillance techniques which are intrinsic to the organisation and process of work, as is increasingly the case in technology-intensive businesses. Such performance surveillance techniques are prevalent, for example, within the call centre industry, which is frequently characterised as a high technology work environment. Call centres often employ call monitoring equipment to ‘listen in’ on agents’ calls, as well as gathering information about the length and number of calls and the rate of administration work, the latter being measured by means of keystroke monitoring software. This has led academics involved in the study of the call centre industry to conclude that such surveillance technologies represent “the new industrial tyranny”, as “the tyranny of the assembly line is but a Sunday school picnic compared to the control that management can exercise in computer telephony” (Fernie & Metcalf, 1998).
However, performance surveillance is not limited to relatively low-skilled call centre employment, as the following quotation confirms:
“Even in workplaces staffed by highly skilled information technology specialists, bosses demand the right to spy on every detail of a worker’s performance. Modern, networked systems can interrogate computers to determine which software is being run, how often and in what manner. A comprehensive audit trail gives managers a profile of each user, and a panorama of how the workers are interacting with their machines. The software also gives managers total central control over the software on each individual PC. A manager can now remotely modify or suspend programmes on any machine, whilst at the same time reading and analysing e-mail traffic and internet activity.” (Davies, 1999)
In summary, it can be said that both the substance and form of surveillance technology are evolving rapidly within many different social contexts, particularly the workplace. The increased power and pervasiveness of these technologies are at the brink of being capable of providing a constant stream of intelligence relating to the activities of any particular individual. It seems that at the start of the new millennium, we are indeed living beneath the gaze of a ‘virtual panopticon’.
Chapter 5: The Surveillance Rationale
Whose interests are served?
This chapter goes on to examine the social purpose of the virtual panopticon, discussing both the ‘false’ and the ‘genuine’ motives, which can be said to underpin the surveillance phenomenon.
The central questions here are whose interests are being promoted in the deployment of surveillance technologies, and what lies behind the intrusion of surveillance into individuals’ private lives?
5.1 Crime Prevention
Many factors are claimed to justify the use of surveillance. In terms of surveillance in public spaces, crime prevention is perhaps the most widely quoted rationale. In 1992, an Audit Commission responsible for evaluating local authorities efficient use of allocated resources turned its attention toward local authority measures to combat the rising crime rate. The Commission produced a report calling for a massive expansion of proactive, intelligence-led policing, and singled out CCTV as having a major role to play in crime prevention (Norris & Armstrong, 1999). Initial investment in CCTV deployments was supported in the wake of growing concern about rising crime and public safety, and previous radical concerns about the implications of constant surveillance were superseded by New Left Realist issues such as the impact of crime upon victims and upon the working classes. Indeed, public support for surveillance has arguably endured – the following chapter will examine the reasons for this. The crime prevention rationale has come to encompass a variety of different aspects of crime, leading to the installation of miniature cameras at automatic teller machines (ATMs) to prevent fraudulent use of bank cards, and of traffic surveillance systems to detect traffic offences such as speeding.
In relation to workplace surveillance, the crime prevention rationale is also heavily emphasised. The removal of key objects from the workplace by employees, whether it be computer software, office stationery, or even their own presence is deemed to be sufficient justification for the presence of surveillance technologies. This is perhaps a valid point, bearing in mind that ‘staff larceny’ has been estimated by The Association of British Insurers to cost British business £1 billion each year, £200 million in software products alone (Guardian, 01/09/99). Surveillance is also routinely used to uncover evidence of activities such as cheating (e.g. insider trading in the City), industrial espionage, fraudulent claims for time off and staff disloyalty or other conduct deemed ‘unprofessional’. Of these, the theft most frowned upon is claimed to be that of one’s own labour – absenteeism is the ultimate sin and moonlighting a potential sackable offence.
Besides the detection of staff ‘crime’, surveillance is also claimed by employers to be necessitated by legislative issues. E-mail monitoring, for example, is justified on the grounds that e-mail content may constitute sexual harassment, leaving the employer open to legal liability. In 1995, a U.S. company called Chevron paid $2.2 million to four female employees to settle a suit in which the women claimed they were sexually harassed because of jokes sent through the company’s e-mail system (Computer Weekly, 16/03/00).
Despite the apparent validity of these claims, there is overwhelming evidence that surveillance also serves entirely different purposes. To many, this security rationale is simply the acceptance veneer of surveillance, disguising a far more insidious objective: that of social control.
5.2 Social Control
One dimension of the drive toward social control is the ‘control revolution’ (Beniger, 1996), which refers to the bureaucratic drive which aims to achieve tighter predictability as a means to greater control. Bureaucracy has become an increasingly vital instrument (and indeed, source) of power since the marginalisation of overt physical force as a means of discipline within social organisations. Its founder, Max Weber “saw bureaucracy as a power instrument of the first order and believed that the bureaucratisation of administration when completely carried through establishes a form of power relation that is ‘practically unshatterable’” (Morgan, 1997). Indeed, bureaucracy can be widely observed within modern organisations, leading many commentators to highlight its negative implications as a mode of social control. Ritzer argues that the bureaucratic imperative of predictability drives business organisations to strive for complete rationalisation, involving formalisation, routinisation, order and discipline (Ritzer, 1996). To this end, both work and workers are increasingly mechanised; that is to say that humans are viewed as being like machines, and they are replaced where possible by non-human technology. Thus bureaucracy can be seen to be an attempt to eradicate human irrationality and the associated uncertainty produced in organisations, and to achieve a superior form of control whereby all ‘parts’ are fully compliant (Ritzer, 1996).
In this context, bureaucratic control (i.e. increasing the probability of a desired outcome) is also regarded as the logic behind many forms of surveillance (Lyon, 1998). As Lyon intimates, this adds an additional layer of explanation to the security rationale, with surveillance activity used to minimise the risk of undesirable outcomes:
“Employers try to reduce risk – of workers using office time or equipment (for) their own purposes, for instance in employment situations. The police, in concert with other institutions, work towards preventing the risks of crimes being committed, or, more generally, of threatening behaviours. And marketers do all in their power to avoid risks of lost opportunities, market niches and ultimately, profit” (Lyon, 1998).
The concepts of bureaucratic control and surveillance are intrinsically linked to that of power. In general terms power is defined as the ability to make someone do something they would not otherwise do (Weber, 1954). In this sense, power is distinct from the concept of ‘authority’ so conveniently adopted by conventional functionalist management theory, whereby an individual has the ability to get people to do something they do want to do. The imperative to exercise power over others is viewed as having originated in the classical age, when the human body began to be characterised as an object and target of power. As Foucault observes “it is easy enough to find signs of the attention then paid to the body – to the body that is manipulated, shaped, trained, which obeys, responds becomes skilful and increases its forces” (Foucault, 1977a). Indeed, many of the themes within management theory can be understood in terms of this imperative to exercise power. It is viable, for example, to regard the fundamental purpose of Taylorist and Fordist principles of scientific management, which separated the conception of work from its execution (McLoughlin, 1999), to be to divert control of work from workers to managers. By expropriating workers of their exclusive knowledge and skill, managers also seize a vital source of power and control.
Foucault was among the early theorists to discuss this relationship between surveillance and power. To recap, Foucault drew attention to the merit of the panopticon as a metaphor for the modern disciplinary power apparatus, based on isolation, individuation and supervision:
“(The panopticon) is an important mechanism, for it automizes and disindividualizes power. Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which the individual is caught up” (Foucault, 1977a).
To this end, Foucault saw methods of surveillance and assessment of individuals as effective tools for the orderly regimentation of others as docile bodies. The key notion of docility entails the use of discipline to render the subject of power incapable of resistance. Surveillance can be interpreted thus, as a form of discipline, because it asserts on the subject pressure to conform to behaviours deemed acceptable, whilst accepting others as ‘deviant’. The way in which surveillance fulfils this disciplinary function will be discussed further in the following chapter.
Bearing the above in mind, the increasing scope of workplace surveillance and its intrusion into areas of employees’ lives, previously considered ‘private’ is a disturbing trend, as it represents an extension of the monitoring/control function of employers into employees’ personal lives. The ‘virtual panopticon’ is one aspect to this: surveillance of private communication, for example, not only detects offensive material, but can also uncover a wide range of information about the employee’s personal interactions and relationships. Similarly, drug testing can be regarded as a mechanism for controlling the ‘deviant’ behaviours that an employee may engage in during his/her spare time.
As has already been discussed, surveillance as an organisational trend is no exception to this relationship, as it is revealed as a device for managerial control. The existence of the ‘virtual panopticon’ is simply representative of a growing trend for management to regulate and control employees’ behaviour.
In addition to technological monitoring, employees are also subject to other, arguably more discrete, forms of surveillance which are also capable of detecting ‘deviance’ from the organisational norm in the ‘private’ domain. The provision of company benefits is one case of this, as demonstrated in the extreme example of Toyota City, a Japanese corporate community wherein every need – from hairdressers to gymnasiums, from shopping to entertainment – is satisfied by the company. This paternalistic approach is widely regarded as being divisive, instilling in employees a complete dependence on those in authority. Far from the image of a workers’ utopia put forward by many, Toyota City is regarded here as symbolising the extent to which work organisations are capable of creating structures which enable total surveillance – and hence total control – of employees’ lives, and as signifying a disturbing vision of the future.
Likewise, many strands of the recent ‘cultural engineering’ initiatives can be argued to create greater opportunities for surveillance of social interaction and personal relationships. Open plan offices, for example, are claimed to eradicate barriers between workers and management as managers emerge from their ‘closed office’. But what is the true purpose behind this structural change: for managers to become more accessible to employees, or for employees’ behaviour to become more accessible to the scrutiny of managers?
5.3 Governmentality and Labour as Dressage
At this point, we need to place this analysis of workplace surveillance within the broader context of increasing state surveillance. Through the extension of their surveillance interests into workers’ private lives, employers appear to be taking increasing responsibility for control of the populace. In relation to this, the feature of work as a means of controlling the population has been discussed in a variety of contexts. Jackson and Carter (1998) present an extremely insightful development of Foucault’s work on the themes of ‘governmentality’ and ‘labour as dressage’.
Governmentality “relates to the management of a population, at an aggregate level (the state) and also at a micro level.” The process compounds a “matrix of apparatuses, logic, techniques…of control”, and both levels “are linked through the overarching rationale of managing.” To this end governmentality “….seeks to control deviance. It enforces obedience to the rules, which are intended to control, in considerable detail the ‘conduct of men’… On this basis, behaviour which does not conform to the rules is de facto deviant” (Jackson & Carter, 1998).
Jackson and Carter argue that governmentality denotes a shift “from forms of rule which focus on the management of boundaries to protect the integrity of the state both as territory and refuge, to forms of rule which focus on the disposition of the state’s inhabitants” (ibid.) They state further that governmentality necessitates the holding of detailed knowledge of the population; thus providing a rationale for State-level informational surveillance.
As stated earlier governmentality also applies to the micro-level, and thus the State is said to extend it’s control (and, in conjunction, its surveillance capacity) by means of various micro-level instruments. The notion of ‘labour as dressage’ characterises the concept of work as one such instrument. Jackson and Carter argue that:
“…labour as dressage is a function of governmentality, (in) that it is management not for economic or productive purposes, but for ‘reasons of state’, the reasons of the governors, which require in the governed docility, obedience, discipline and self-control” (ibid.).
5.3 Governmentality and Labour as Dressage
At this point, we need to place this analysis of workplace surveillance within the broader context of increasing state surveillance. Through the extension of their surveillance interests into workers’ private lives, employers appear to be taking increasing responsibility for control of the populace. In relation to this, the feature of work as a means of controlling the population has been discussed in a variety of contexts. Jackson and Carter (1998) present an extremely insightful development of Foucault’s work on the themes of ‘governmentality’ and ‘labour as dressage’. Governmentality “relates to the management of a population, at an aggregate level (the state) and also at a micro level.” The process compounds a “matrix of apparatuses, logic, techniques…of control”, and both levels “are linked through the overarching rationale of managing.” To this end governmentality “….seeks to control deviance. It enforces obedience to the rules, which are intended to control, in considerable detail the ‘conduct of men’… On this basis, behaviour which does not confirm to the rules is de facto deviant” (Jackson & Carter, 1998).
Jackson and Carter argue that governmentality denotes a shift “from forms of rule which focus on the management of boundaries to protect the integrity of the state both as territory and refuge, to forms of rule which focus on the disposition of the state’s inhabitants” (ibid.) They state further that governmentality necessitates the holding of detailed knowledge of the population; thus providing a rationale for State-level informational surveillance.
As stated earlier governmentality also applies to the micro-level, and thus the State is said to extend it’s control (and, in conjunction, its surveillance capacity) by means of various micro-level instruments. The notion of ‘labour as dressage’ characterises the concept of work as one such instrument. Jackson and Carter argue that:
“…labour as dressage is a function of governmentality, (in) that it is management not for economic or productive purposes, but for ‘reasons of state’, the reasons of the governors, which require in the governed docility, obedience, discipline and self-control” (ibid.).
Thus, labour itself appears to be a vital means of controlling the populace, by conditioning workers to behave obediently and in line with prescribed rules. It also operates as a device to ‘occupy’ the masses, thus ensuring that their attention is diverted from disrupting the 'stability' of the system. These are both important factors in relation to surveillance at work, which serves to monitor, and in doing so, modify ‘deviant’ behaviour.
The employment system may be regarded as an additional micro-level instrument of governmentality. Punishment for social deviance (i.e. forms of behaviour deemed deviant within society) is increasingly administered by the employment system; potential employees, for example, can now run the risk of failing to gain employment if they fail a drugs test. But is the role of work organisations really to monitor ‘moral’ or societal deviance?
As stated previously, the principle of governmentality constitutes as logical explanation for the increasing infringement of surveillance on employee’s private lives, but one which presents extremely worrying applications.
The following chapter continues to discuss the notion of personal privacy, and examines why it is that employees, and the populace as a whole, seems willing to accept growing intrusion into their formerly ‘private’ lives.
Chapter 6: Docile Bodies
Why is there so little resistance to increasing levels of technological surveillance?
Despite growing surveillance across a range of social contexts there is surprisingly little resistance to the surveillance phenomenon. Public support has largely endured, even in the face of increasing scrutiny of individuals’ private lives. To identify the reasons for this it is necessary to re-examine the concept of power, focusing specifically on its capacity to promote conformity.
In his radical discussion of power, Lukes argued that power is not simply concerned with overriding competing preferences and disregarding subordinates’ grievances; rather it is a case of suppressing any opposition at the most basic level – within a person’s individual consciousness:
“…is not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial” (Lukes, 1974).
Foucault’s concept of the power-knowledge discourse provides insight into how this shaping of perceptions, cognitions and preferences is achieved (Foucault, 1977b). Essentially, the power-knowledge discourse determines how, where, when and by whom knowledge is produced. Foucault assigns control of this discourse to those with power; hence the powerful are considered to have the ability to control what actually constitutes knowledge. As a result, knowledge of any phenomenon becomes a function of who is involved in that particular discourse and to what extent they influence the discourse by exercising their power. Applied to the phenomenon of surveillance it is evident that there are two powerful groups (assuming their divisibility) who justify and thereby maintain the surveillance society. Firstly, political governors, who seek to perpetuate surveillance in order to retain their ability to control the state’s inhabitants. Secondly, governors of capital (i.e. management), who seek to perpetuate surveillance in order to protect ownership interests by ensuring that workers are adequately controlled in order that they will perform as directed, without question. The assumption that these two bodies of power exist as separate entities raises the question of which exerts influence over the other? Is it that the political governors act to maintain the status quo on behalf of the owners of capital, or is it that the owners of capital act to extend and reinforce the state’s control of the populace? This issue perhaps resembles the well-known chicken/egg debate, and in fact the answer is probably that the two are mutually reinforcing. The main conclusion to be drawn is that through a power-knowledge discourse, essentially controlled by politicians and managers, we are conditioned to accept the need for surveillance as being self-evident. In this way, the public’s docility with respect to surveillance is ensured.
The power-knowledge discourse of surveillance centres largely around the security rationale outlined in the early part of the chapter. This explains the lack of resistance to surveillance: people see it as a case of ‘if you aren’t doing anything ‘wrong’ what do you have to fear from surveillance?’ This rationale tends to negate the influence of concerns relating to personal privacy.
The dissemination of the power-knowledge discourse of surveillance arguably occurs largely through the engagement of techno-mediatic power. Derrida (1994) states that techno-mediatic power incorporates three cultural apparatuses – the political, the mass-media and the scholarly-academic – which interact to reinforce the dominant capitalist hegemony. He argues further that the use of techno-mediatic power functions to condition our view of what democracy means and thereby constitutes a serious threat to democratic process. This can be observed clearly in relation to surveillance: the capitalist requirement for surveillance (substitute “control”) is vindicated to various extents through the aforementioned cultural apparatuses. Thus, the populace is constantly being conditioned to perceive the ‘divine right’ of those in power to monitor the activity of others.
Having looked at how peoples’ perception of surveillance are moulded in various ways, it is important to examine how conditioning at this level serves to alter human behaviour. The metaphor of the panopticon highlights the way in which the populace is actively involved in supporting surveillance, not only in thought but also in deed. One of the major reasons for the efficiency and efficacy of the panopticon as a surveillance mechanism is its ability to instil in the subject the imperative for self-surveillance. The method by which the panopticon achieves this is outlined in the following quotation:
“(The panopticon) is a device which permits a small number of unseen people to observe, scrutinise and continually analyse a collective which is externally exposed. Thus an essential condition is realised. A small number of people are transformed into objects, guinea pigs…Exposure to scientific curiosity is absolute: every gesture, every sign of discomfort, of pain, of impatience, every intimacy comes thus to be described, classified, compared, analysed and studied. The inmate progressively internalises the consciousness of his permanent visibility, of his expropriated exposure. On this conscious level, his salvation – or his complete alienation as something ‘different’, ‘deviant’ – depends solely on self-control, on the discipline he imposes on his body, on his capacity to assume in his behaviour patterns the appearance of being ‘subject to power’. The only alternative is in fact ‘destruction’ – insanity. Thus, the observed inmate himself comes to be the instrument of his own subjection, of his own transformation into something different.” (Horkenheimer & Adorno, 1972).
Thus, the subject of surveillance is compelled to self-monitor; to prevent and correct ‘deviant’ behaviour. This may manifest in a variety of forms: either the individual has to prevent the deviant behaviour, correct the behaviour, or manage impressions in order to at least appear to conform. To take the example of drug-testing; the individual may never take drugs in the first place, through an understanding that such behaviour that such behaviour is ‘deviant’ and may/would be monitored and detected. Or, the individual may cease a drug habit, again owing to a perception that such behaviour is deviant and would be detected in it were to continue. Alternatively, the individual may continue their ‘deviance’ but manage to impressions to try and conceal or excuse their behaviour, and express their will to ultimately conform.
If fear of detection or repercussion can drive an individual to such extreme measures, then perhaps simply conforming in the first place is the option requiring least effort, even in cases where society’s definition of deviance is not naturally aligned to that of the individual. Surveillance enables those in power to be not only omnipotent, but omniscient and omnipresent, thus inducing in workers or citizens a powerful conviction that it is pointless to ‘rebel’.
Which individuals? To what degree or extent does this apply?
Relative to power/privilege.
Self-monitoring and impression management appear in a variety of forms. In the context of modern capitalist society, it is asserted here that individuals are also encouraged to self-survey according to pre-defined concepts of brand- and personal ‘image’. These concepts induce in the individual an interpretation of themselves as a consumer, thus solving the basic problem of advanced capitalism, which is not so much how to produce a good or service, but rather how to sell it. To a great extent, notions of brand and personal image are created and sustained through the medium of advertising, which has been characterised as a hyper-real medium (Poster, 1990).
This means that advertising operates within a conception of reality that is totally removed from real life. Much critical analysis has therefore centred on the role of the advertisement in undermining the buyer’s latent rationality, shifting the instrumental rationality of the exchange into desire for unnecessary consumption. However, as Poster points out, the social effect of the advertisement is not economic or psychological but linguistic. In advertising, “a communication is enacted…which is not found in daily life. An unreal is made real, a set of meanings is communicated that have no meaning. In Baudrillard’s terms, a simulation of communication is communicated which is more real than reality” (Poster, 1990, quoting Baudrillard, 1983).
Advertising can be regarded thus, as an attempt to manipulate the rationality of individuals, instilling consumerist ideals which are then mobilised through self-surveillance. This is particularly evident in the case of people feeling they have to conform to notions of ‘fashion’ by wearing the best quality designer brands.
Returning to the work context, individuals feel the pressure to self-monitor in almost every situation. The recruitment process, largely through the influence of human resource management, now serves to analyse the candidate’s ability to self-monitor as much as anything else. Questions such as “what is your greatest achievement in life?” and “what are your three greatest weaknesses?” are regular questions which require the individual to (a) potentially divulge more personal and private information and (b) demonstrate an ability to self-monitor, for example by explaining how these ‘terrible’ (human) weaknesses were overcome.
The dominant, patriarchal masculine managerial perception of culture as being something the organisation has, rather than something it is (Smircich, 1983) also leads to individuals being forced to self-survey and conform at work. This view of culture has manifested in several management guru-led fads, since the 1960s – which exhorted management to engineer open, friendly organisational culture. In many cases, the management aim is certainly to maintain the impression of an open, friendly work environment, through male-/masculine biased gung-ho activities such as ‘beer busts’ and the like, whilst eradicating people who did not ‘fit’ with this ‘new’ convivial atmosphere. Thus, employees now have another thing to worry about: are they deviant in relation to the newly-imposed organisational culture. If cultural ‘norms’ are founded on the basis of functionalist ideals, they are bound to differ from the reality of employees’ shared views and experiences. Yet the phenomenon of self-surveillance offers those in power the opportunity to assert these ideals, as organisational members perceive the need to modify their behaviour to align to the distinct entity that is the organisation’s ‘culture’.
In summary, we might argue that we are conditioned to accept surveillance through the operation of several different power mechanisms. We ‘willingly’ allow those in power to undertake ever more intrusive surveillance. Moreover, we actively participate by subjecting ourselves to surveillance, largely on the basis of others’ perceptions of what is right and what is wrong. Thus, surveillance is capable of suffusing every waking hour.
This is, however, a somewhat cynical reflection. In reality, despite the extremely effective power-based rationalisation of surveillance, there is growing opposition from a distinct minority of society. Thus, the next chapter goes on to look at cases of where these power mechanisms appear to be failing, and in what ways certain members of society are resisting the intrusiveness of surveillance and all it represents.
Chapter 7: Breaking The System - The Surveillance Rebellion
How is resistance to surveillance manifesting?
7.1 The Right to Privacy
Before looking at the ways in which people are expressing resistance to surveillance, it is necessary to put this resistance into context with the previous chapter, examining how this resistance has arisen despite the ways in which power instruments generally induce acceptance.
A possible explanation for the ‘backlash’ is contained in Foucault’s concept of the power-knowledge discourse. Foucault argued that it is not possible to challenge directly a particular power-knowledge discourse as opposing views are prevented from entering into the dominant rationale (Foucault, 1977b). As a result, for there to be any sort of forum for opposing views, a new power-knowledge discourse must be established.
This may lead us to question whether there may be a new power-knowledge discourse emerging on the subject of surveillance; one which opposes the drive for social control, and emphasises the human desire and need for social freedom. This discourse, if it is assumed to exist, is still far from dominant, as its ideological basis is largely grounded in radical preoccupations. However, it does seem that such a discourse might be gaining support in light of the virtual panopticon and increasing intrusion into private lives.
If there is a definitive logic which has the potential to supersede that of surveillance, it is perhaps the notion of privacy. Gibson Burrell argues that “in the face of increased state surveillance of the populace, a “possessive self-protecting individualism” (Gouldner, 1970: 99) leads to the growth of the concept of privacy” (Burrell, 1997). Privacy is, however, an extremely difficult concept to evaluate, especially as definitions can vary enormously. On one hand, privacy is defined within an entirely informational context, describing the extent to which others have access to an individual’s personal information. On the other, privacy extends beyond the information domain and encompasses the notions of anonymity and restricted physical access. Perhaps the most embracing characterisations of privacy incorporate issues related to autonomy, such as who has control over the intimacies of personal identity. The latter interpretation, wherebv privacy is the measure of the extent to which an individual is afforded the social and legal space to develop the emotional, cognitive, spiritual and socially moral/ethical powers of an autonomous agent, is the one adopted here. Thus, privacy is vital in limiting surveillance and promoting social freedoms, as it restricts scrutiny by others and thus their control over our lives (Schoeman, 1992).
Burrell argues that privacy is asserted by means of secret societies such as the Freemasons, whose cultural mechanisms ensure the absolute priority of maintaining privacy:
“The techniques for establishing privacy in the face of systems of state surveillance have been in place for centuries. They involve close control of the membership, systems of exclusion…and ‘punishment’ for treachery to the group’s aims and objectives” (Burrell, 1997).
Resistance to surveillance has evidently taken on this form to a certain extent, with the emergence of ‘underground’ interest groups that work to preserve personal privacy. However, there have been few reported cases of individuals grouping together in secret societies in order to prevent surveillance intrusion: indeed, such activity would be likely to attract further scrutiny. Instead, the backlash against surveillance seems to consist of embryonic debate about the problems relating to privacy invasion, and increasing calls for legal safeguards.
7.2 Legal Restriction
There are several aspects of surveillance which are currently receiving increasing attention and criticism within society. These include issues ranging from drug testing and e-mail tracking in the workplace, to national identity cards and military satellite surveillance capability. This criticism may well be at the root of legislative moves which will supposedly restrict surveillance. The new Data Protection Act, which came into force in March 2000 appears to significantly extend the rights of employees, particularly in relation to privacy in the informational sense. The specific content of this Act is outlined in the Appendix, but essentially it extends to employees the rights that customers have to access, question and control the information held by a company. Importantly, by law, employees are now required to give consent to the recording and storing of information about themselves.
It may seem that the above constitutes an outright contradiction of the arguments presented in Chapter 5, and provides grounds for optimism. However, the extent of such legislation’s impact is debatable. The new Data Protection Act is enforced by a government-appointed Data Protection Registrar, which raises questions about how strictly and consistently it will be enforced. There are also issues with the principle that employees must give their consent to communications recording; as the previous chapters have outlined employees are more likely to comply, as they are conditioned to accept the need for surveillance in line with the ‘false’ security rationale.
Moreover, these earlier laws only regulate for privacy in its narrowest sense, i.e. the information domain. The Human Rights Act, which does cover a broader concept of privacy, will only cover public authorities and private bodies with public functions.
In some quarters the thinking is that these rights will eventually be extended to private companies, but this is perhaps overly optimistic. Even for those in the public sector the right to privacy in the Convention is not absolute, and surveillance at work will still be possible if there are ‘good grounds’ – such as specific suspicion – and the response is proportional to the alleged offence. This raises the issue of who determines what are ‘good grounds’? Ultimately, this still leaves scope for employers (and courts) to sustain surveillance on the basis of the ‘false’ rationale outlined in Chapter 5.
Perhaps the greatest indication of the government’s actual intent (or lack thereof) to curb surveillance is the fact that it has no plans to specifically address the use of covert cameras, audio recording equipment or computer monitoring in the workplace.
7.3 Turning The Tables On The Virtual Panopticon
So where does this leave our ‘surveillance rebellion’? There is evidently a lack of compulsion on the part of both employers and the State to self-regulate effectively, particularly against the panoptic implications of new technologies. This is perhaps an area where the more IT-savvy are beginning to have an impact. There are several instances where new technologies are being ‘turned against’ governments and large organisations. Computer hacking, for example, takes advantage of organisations’ technological infrastructure to scrutinise or even sabotage their activity. The recent ‘Love Bug’ computer virus, for example, has been alleged to have been caused by a disgruntled Philippine employee who hacked into one of the country’s major Internet Service Provider’s computer systems. The resulting disruption extended to organisations worldwide, including the British government.
Indeed, surveillance technologies themselves, are also being used to ‘turn the tables’, as the following quotation from http://wearecam.org/netcam_privacy_issues.htmlhighlights:
“Information is power, seeing is believing, and organizations believe in power – power over individuals. But the tables are turning. The very miniaturization that has made it possible for police to hide cameras is shopping mall washrooms has also made camcorders small and light enough for average citizens to carry around and capture events like the Rodney King beating…Miniaturization has turned the technology into an equalizer rather than an oppressor. As with many problems, the problem of surveillance contains its own solution…Surveillance is actually desirable when aimed at Big Brother (and possibly also Big Business). It would seem logical that organizations capable of wrongdoing should be placed under a degree of surveillance proportional to their capacity to inflict damage to society. The potential damage, to society, of a large and unaccountable organization, operating above the law, is far greater than the damage an individual might inflict by stealing a loaf of bread. Thus it is possible that society would do well to place certain large organizations under greater scrutiny than a shopper at the local convenience store…”
This quotation emphasises the way in which citizens can employ surveillance technologies for their own ends, and promotes monitoring of private enterprises in the same way that they monitor us. This quote is from the website of Steve Mann, an active believer in the power of ‘turning the tables’. He was largely responsible for organising a ‘National Accountability Day’ event, whereby people were encouraged to perform surveillance on major corporations.
The picture at the beginning of this chapter (in original paper/hard copy) also demonstrates a rather unusual form of surveillance resistance. The ‘surveillance camera players’ re-enact plays in front of significant CCTV cameras, thus restricting their surveillance capability.
In summary, it appears that a new power-knowledge discourse might well be emerging, resulting in various expressions of resistance to surveillance. However, the impact of such resistance is arguably negligible at this time, as it seems to consist mainly of overly tentative legal restriction (with caveats/exclusions) and radical underground movements. For surveillance to be effectively curbed, perhaps society – and particularly employees – need to have a greater appreciation of its true nature.
Chapter 8: Summary
What can we learn here?
This chapter consolidates the key arguments made within the study, and presents their resultant conclusions which relate to the eradication of personal privacy.
To recap, it has been argued that new technologies are significantly enhancing surveillance capability, to the extent that they can be treated as a virtual panopticon. Both the substance and form of surveillance technology are evolving rapidly within many different social contexts, particularly the workplace. The increased power and pervasiveness of these technologies are practically able to provide a constant stream of intelligence relating to the activities of any particular individual.
The surveillance society that such technologies support is justified largely through a ‘false’ rationale of security and crime prevention, which conditions the public to accept surveillance and ensures their docility in relation to it. Similarly, surveillance itself has a disciplinary role, acting as a mechanism of social control both within the workplace and in the wider context of nation states.
Thus surveillance serves to reinforce the existing capitalist hegemony, extending the power of those in ‘government’ far into the reaches of individuals’ formally private lives. There appears to be two powerful groups whose interests are promoted by surveillance, and thus seek to justify and maintain it. Firstly, political governors, who seek to perpetuate surveillance in order to retain their ability to monitor and control the state’s inhabitants. Secondly, governors of capital (i.e. management), who seek to perpetuate surveillance in order to protect ownership interests by ensuring the workers are adequately controlled in order that they will perform as directed, without question. These groups are able to sustain surveillance by controlling the power-knowledge discourse of surveillance, and by disseminating the content of this discourse through cultural apparatuses.
This is achieved with very little resistance; the panoptic effect ensures that individuals support surveillance both in thought and in deed, as they are rendered the subject of self-surveillance. Several coping strategies may emerge as a result of the individual’s assumption of the need to modify their own behaviours in line with the prescribed conceptions of right and wrong; of ‘deviance’. In some cases, individuals employ impression management strategies in an attempt to detract from their ‘deviant’ behaviour.
Despite the strength of these power mechanisms in ensuring compliance with surveillance, resistant to the intrusiveness of surveillance (read social control) into private life is beginning to materialise. This is manifesting in increasing legal regulation – although this is not expected to significantly restrict surveillance activity and all it represents – and technological ‘rebellion’ through computer hacking, and surveillance of large corporations.
Finally, it has been argued that privacy is a fundamental component of social freedom, and that the best opportunity for limiting future surveillance lies in opposition to privacy invasion.
In contrast to these arguments, there have been several appeals to focus on the more positive aspects of surveillance. Webster (1995), for example, claims that surveillance is a pre-requisite for autonomy, or, as he calls it individuality, i.e. “being in charge of one’s own destiny, having genuine choices in and control over one’s life”.
He highlights the paradox of autonomy/individuality and individuation, whereby information is held about every member of society, arguing that it is necessary to know a great deal about the members of society in order to respect and support their individuality (ibid.). Abercrombie et al similarly draw attention to the individuality-individuation paradox, stating that “individuation, by enhancing the rights of the individual, leads to greater surveillance and control of the population”. These arguments are fundamentally flawed, however, as they disregard the disciplinary nature of surveillance and its power to modify people’s behaviour. How can surveillance be judged to promote individuality and equality, when its primary function is to instil (social) conformity and compliance?
Another argument in favour of surveillance is that it may be capable of replacing managers, by empowering employees to demand ‘why do we need managers’? (McLoughlin, 1999). However, this neglects the idea the surveillance is simply a means to extend managerial control, not substitute nor replace it. The fundamental raison d’etre of management is to observe, analyse and plan capital’s interests (Taylor, 1947), and surveillance serves to reinforce this ideology of control, by enabling the collection of a wider range of information and by rendering the actual mode of power invisible. Thus, surveillance is unlikely to ‘liberate’ employees and citizens, surveillance reduces their power, allowing their every move to be scrutinised and assessed by the governors of capital. This is evident in the strain which surveillance can exert on the individual: lack of autonomy at work is accepted as being a major cause of stress-related problems and illness (Hazards, 58, 1997).
The real key to empowerment thus seems to be the recognition of surveillance as a form of control, and an accompanying reduction in the extent to which it pervades many aspects of social relations. Privacy is a vital component of social freedom as it preserves our autonomy as individuals to exercise control over our own lives, decisions, and values. With exclusive access to and knowledge of particular aspects of our lives, we can ensure that only we as individuals are the ones in control of them.
Reference Diagram
Sociological Paradigms
Gareth Morgan and Gibson Burrell.
Radical is understood here to mean that which is rooted in acceptance of systemic change, emergence and dynamism, versus structuralism or conservatism, which emphasises preservation of the status quo.
The Panopticon Prison Design
According to Wikipedia, this plan of Jeremy Bentham's panopticon prison was drawn by Willey Reveley in 1791, based on Jeremy Bentham's design.
By Jeremy Bentham - The works of Jeremy Bentham vol. IV, 172-3, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=3130497